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INTRODUCTION 
“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is 
that too often it does.”1  It is the way in which the individual Justices 
on the United States Supreme Court approach this reality that de-
fines the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.2  This in turn dic-
tates what race-related actions we, as a society, are permitted to en-
gage in under the law.  Today the school choice movement has led to 
the creation of charter schools with a racialized curriculum.  An ex-
ample of such a school is the Marcus Garvey African Centered Acad-
emy in Detroit, Michigan.  Under the Court’s emerging interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause, known as the antibalkinization 
perspective, the Garvey Academy and other race-conscious charter 
schools are unconstitutional.  That is to say, these schools reduce so-
cial cohesion so much that it expectedly leads to segregation. 
For many years, scholars have treated the Justices’ approaches to 
race in strictly binary terms:  anti-classification and anti-
subordination.3  The majority of the Justices on the Court, who are 
deemed “race conservatives,” espouse the anti-classification view.4  
The anti-classification viewpoint is based on the belief that the Con-
 
  J.D. Candidate 2013.  This is dedicated to every teacher who tells his or her students, “Yes, 
you can.”  It is especially for my dear friend, Alexandra, who every morning walks into her 
classroom in the South Bronx and fills it with strength and love.  I would also like to 
thank my family for encouraging me to pursue this topic regardless of its controversy.  
Lastly, I could not have written this Comment without the advice of Professor of Law 
Kermit Roosevelt, who helped me find the law to match the ideas I so desperately wanted 
to convey. 
 1 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 2 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o state 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 3 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness To Antibalkinization:  An Emerging Ground of Decision in 
Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281 (2011). 
 4 See id. at 1281–82 (defining the phrases “race conservatives,” “race progressives,” “race 
moderates,” and “antibalkinization”). 
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stitution protects individuals, not groups.5  In the tradition of Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, they believe the law is color-
blind.6  As a result, these Justices tend to strike down civil rights initia-
tives such as affirmative action policies because they classify individu-
als on the basis of race.7  On the other end of the spectrum, the 
minority members of the Court who may be called “race progres-
sives,” maintain the anti-subordination view of race.8  These Justices 
tend to uphold racial equality laws because they find racial stratifica-
tion harmful.9  They seek to eradicate the vestiges of historical racial 
oppression.10 
Law Professor Reva B. Siegel, has breathed new life into this stale, 
binary framework by terming a third emerging and independent ap-
proach to the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence:  the anti-
balkinization perspective.11  Here, the median voters on the Court, al-
so known as “race moderates,” in both upholding and limiting racial 
equality laws, operate under a different set of principles and concerns 
than those of the majority and the minority members.12  Their main 
concern is with social cohesion.13  These median Justices, in seeking 
“to avoid racial arrangements that balkanize and threaten social co-
hesion,” do not fall neatly into either the anti-classification or the an-
ti-subordination camp.14  Therefore, the antibalkinization perspec-
tive’s concern with ending the social divisiveness that comes from 
increasing the salience of one’s race makes it an independent, com-
peting theory with the Court’s predominant approaches to race. 
 
 5 Id. at 1281. 
 6 See id. at 1282; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554–55 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). 
 7 Siegel, supra note 3, at 1281. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 1297. 
 12 Id. at 1281.  The median voters espousing the antibalkinization principle began with Jus-
tice Powell in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justice 
O’Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and under the Roberts Court with 
Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seatle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007).  
 13 Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkinization, supra note 3, at 1281. 
 14 Id. at 1299.  However, aspects of the antibalikinization conceptual framework are clearly 
borrowed from the anti-subordination view.  For example, proponents of the anti-
balkinization principle recognize that in order to “get beyond race, it may be necessary to 
take race into account” in order to remedy racial wrongs without stirring racial resent-
ment.  Id. at 1302.  Therefore, the goal of promoting social cohesion requires a consider-
ation of social context and meaning, an endeavor that is also at the heart of the anti-
subordination principle. 
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This Comment uses the emerging antibalkinization perspective to 
analyze the constitutionality of race-conscious charter schools.15  It 
does so by analyzing one school in particular, the Marcus Garvey Af-
rican Centered Academy.  Race-conscious charter schools will be re-
ferred to as public schools that have Afrocentric curricula.  In these 
public schools, there is an emphasis on the importance of being a 
member of the African-American race in nearly every single aspect of 
the students’ educational experience.16  After Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence in Parents Involved, the Court favors racial initiatives that en-
hance the commonality of individuals in society and dismisses those 
that accentuate differences.17  Therefore, under this perspective, race-
conscious charter schools are unconstitutional because a racialized 
curriculum can be expected to lead to segregation, the most dramatic 
result of breaking down social cohesion. 
In Part I, this Comment will address the origins of the charter 
school movement by analyzing the Court’s failure to dismantle de fac-
to segregation after Brown v. Board of Education.18  During this time pe-
riod, the Court was unable to secure meaningful desegregation across 
the country.  As a result, inner-city public schools in particular, which 
are predominately attended by poor racial minorities, continued to 
fail while public schools in wealthier regions attended by non-racial 
minorities tended to thrive.19  As a reaction to the failure of tradition-
al public schools, the black community took its children’s education 
into its own hands.  In hopes of a better education, parents chose to 
send their children to alternative public schools with an Afrocentric 
focus.  Part II will provide background information defining charter 
schools and explaining their general operation.  Part III will serve as a 
close examination of a race-conscious charter school, the Marcus 
Garvey African Centered Academy.  Part IV will then apply the anti-
balkinization perspective to the Garvey Academy and similar charter 
schools by analyzing Garrett v. Board of Education.20  Garrett was the only 
recent case at the time this Comment was written to reach the federal 
 
 15 This Comment will not analyze charter schools under the anti-classification or the anti-
subordination perspectives. 
 16  Garvey Academy, DETROIT PUB. SCH., http://detroitk12.org/schools/school/313 (last visit-
ed Mar. 15, 2013). 
 17 See Siegel, supra note 3, at 1301–02 (describing the antibalkinization perspective as reject-
ing initiatives that increase the salience of race, even when it enhances “racial justice”). 
 18 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 19 Due to unequal access to resources and de facto residential segregation, the pattern of 
racial segregation in the public school system essentially remained unchanged after Brown 
I. 
 20 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
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district court and touch on the issue of race-conscious charter 
schools. 
The Comment will conclude by using Garrett as a predictor that 
the constitutionality of race-conscious charter schools will have to be 
litigated in the near future.  It is this Commenter’s hope that, when 
confronted with such litigation, society chooses to improve traditional 
public schools rather than create and fund identity-focused charter 
schools.  This will give children in this country a real opportunity to 
experience greater equality in education, something the Supreme 
Court of the United States could never quite accomplish on its own. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO SECURE AN ERA OF 
DESEGREGATION 
 In the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme 
Court held that racially segregated public schools were unconstitu-
tional.21  The problem then became how the principles of racial 
equality in education under Brown I would be translated into practice.  
What would a desegregated public school system look like?  How do 
we create equal educational opportunities on a non-racial basis?  In 
1955, Chief Justice Warren’s decision in Brown II attempted to solve 
this problem.22  The immediate goal was to give African-American 
children a place in what were traditionally “white” schools.23  Yet, the 
ultimate goal was the full transition to a “unitary, nonracial system of 
public education.”24  However, Brown II was an incredibly weak at-
tempt at achieving this goal.  The Court found that the solution to 
creating a “system of public education freed of racial discrimination” 
was simply to defer to local school authorities.25  In essence, the Court 
left important decisions such as inter-district busing to the same 
school authorities that were once and are likely still riddled with ra-
cial discrimination.26  To add insult to injury, the Court then ordered 
that desegregation initiatives be done with “all deliberate speed,” 
 
 21 347 U.S. at 495. 
 22 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II]. 
 23 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299–301.  While the local school authorities were primarily responsi-
ble for solving racial problems, it was the courts’ job to consider whether the school sys-
tem’s actions were a good faith implementation of the constitutional principles in Brown 
I.  Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299. 
 26 The predominately black public schools were still likely to be disadvantaged by limited 
resources and were ultimately powerless in the overall decision-making process. 
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which provided a weak, uninformative timeline for states and locali-
ties to adhere to.27 
The decision in Brown II did very little in the way of enforcing 
meaningful desegregation in public schooling.  Worse, the Supreme 
Court, when confronted with school desegregation cases after Brown 
II, gradually became disinclined to aid in the fight for racial equality 
in education.  For example, at the start of the desegregation era, 
many school districts found an end-run around the desegregation 
mandate by implementing “freedom of choice” plans.28  Freedom of 
choice plans gave parents the right to choose the school they wanted 
their children to attend.29  These plans allowed white parents to keep 
their children in all-white public schools.30  The Court resolved this 
issue in Green by holding that freedom of choice plans failed to meet 
the standards and principles of desegregation set out in Brown II un-
less they quickly achieved de facto desegregation.31 
In the context of school busing initiatives, the Supreme Court ini-
tially allowed lower courts to order inter-district busing in neighbor-
hoods that were de facto segregated.32  However, judicial support for 
inter-district busing waned when the Court decided Milliken v. Brad-
ley.33  In Milliken, the Court “prevented busing across city and county 
lines [as a form of relief] even if the resulting school systems were 
predominately Black and predominately white.”34  Most recently, the 
Court in Board of Education v. Dowell put the proverbial nail in the cof-
fin of desegregation efforts.35  The majority suggested that a school 
district had engaged in enough desegregation even though dissolving 
the desegregation order would severely compromise the principles of 
Brown I.36  The Court remanded the case to determine whether the 
desegregation decree could be dissolved and the school district could 
 
 27 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
 28 Green, 391 U.S. at 433–34. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. at 441 (“In three years of [the plan’s] operation, not a single white child has cho-
sen to attend [the all-black] Watkins school . . . . [T]he school system remains a dual sys-
tem.”). 
 31 Id. at 437, 440–41. 
 32 E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1971); see also 
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973) (imposing a duty to desegregate even 
without evidence of past de jure segregation). 
 33 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
 34 Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L. J. 1285, 1291 (1992). 
 35 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 36 Id. at 251–52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that thirteen years of desegregation 
was not enough in a district that threatened to re-emerge as an all-white public school, in-
flicting the very kind of stigmatic injury that Brown I sought to eliminate). 
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return to its former one-race, all-white status.37  As a result of the Su-
preme Court’s judicial back-stepping, desegregation decrees across 
the country were gradually terminated even if the school districts did 
not meaningfully reach unitary status.38 
Today we see a heavy pattern of racially segregated neighbor-
hoods and public schools in nearly all of our country’s cities.39  In 
1955, the Court had the opportunity to usher in an era of desegrega-
tion in education that would truly stand for something more than 
constitutional principles on a page.  They failed to do so.  One possi-
ble explanation for this failure is that enforcing desegregation on the 
ground was beyond the Supreme Court’s institutional competency.40  
As Chief Justice Warren suggested in Brown II, these issues were “local 
school problems” that varied across regions.41  There is a strong ar-
gument to be made that it was not in the province of the Court to 
create and enforce uniform school busing programs and other de-
segregation initiatives.  Rather, these issues were something that the 
federal or state legislature, along with local school officials, ought to 
have decided.  An alternative explanation is that the Court may simp-
ly be better at saying no to institutional initiatives than suggesting 
and/or requiring them.42 
Despite the possible exculpating reasons for the Court’s failure to 
enforce desegregation in public schooling, the reality is that our 
country is still paying the price.  Today, many scholars believe that as 
a result we, as a society, have entered into an age of “resegregation.”43  
With resegregation comes old constitutional problems dressed up in 
new clothes.  However, today’s resegregation initiatives in education 
are not created out of racial animus as they previously were under the 
segregation era.  Rather, these initiatives are part of a larger school 
choice movement.  Race-conscious charter schools developed in part 
as an alternative means of educating black children.  It was meant to 
provide them with a better education and a chance at a real future.  
These charter schools were an opportunity for parents to do more 
than stand by helplessly while their children slipped through the pub-
lic school system’s all too welcoming cracks. 
 
 37 Id. at 249–50. 
 38 Kevin D. Brown, Reexamination of the Benefit of Publicly Funded Private Education for African-
American Students in a Post-Desegregation Era, 36 IND. L. REV. 477, 477 (2003). 
 39 Jarvis, supra note 33, at 1285. 
 40 In considering why the Court failed to strongly enforce desegregation efforts, Professor of 
Law Kermit Roosevelt, suggested that institutional competency could be one reason. 
 41 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). 
 42 This consideration was also brought to my attention by Professor Kermit Roosevelt. 
 43 See, e.g., Jarvis, supra note 34; Brown, supra note 38. 
May 2013] RACE-CONSCIOUS CHARTER SCHOOLS 1567 
 
II.  THE CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT IN THE ERA OF RESEGREGATION 
As mentioned previously, it is no secret that public education in 
America is struggling.44  Our country embarrassingly lags behind its 
international counterparts in reading, mathematics, and science test 
scores.45  Again, those who feel the failure of our public school system 
the most tend to be poor, racial minorities in central cities.  Parents 
of these individuals are especially concerned about their children’s 
education.46  Understanding that the Supreme Court and the state, 
federal, and local governments have failed to provide equal access to 
quality education, African-American parents have taken this matter 
into their own hands.  They are among the leaders of the school 
choice movement, demanding nontraditional alternatives, like char-
ter schools, in the educational marketplace for their children.47 
A.  Defining Charter Schools 
The charter school movement is best described as a reinvention of 
public education.48  The movement began in 1991, when Minnesota 
became the first state to pass charter school legislation as a means of 
addressing the state’s educational failings.49  It quickly caught nation-
al attention and followers.50  The charter school movement gained 
strong federal support with the authorization of the Public Charter 
School Program (“PCSP”),51 which is administered by the Department 
 
 44 U.S. Falls in World Education Rankings, Rated ‘Average,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/us-falls-in-world-education-  
  rankings_n_793185.html. 
 45 Id. 
 46 CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN ACTION:  RENEWING PUBLIC EDUCATION 
14 (2000). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 16–17.  The charter school movement is an educational reform effort which elimi-
nates real governmental provision of schools.  Its origins can be traced to educator Ray 
Buddle, who “envisioned an educational system in which school districts granted charter 
agreements to teachers who wished to create new curricula.”  Pearl Rock Kane & Christo-
pher J. Lauricella, Assessing the Growth and Potential of Charter Schools, in PRIVATIZING 
EDUCATION:  CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL 
COHESION? 203, 204 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001). 
 49 JOSEPH MURPHY & CATHERINE DUNN SCHIFFMAN, UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE 
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 27 (2002). 
 50 Id. at 29. 
 51  Improving America’s Schools Act, Pub. L. No 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994) (originally 
codified at 20 U.S.C. § 8061 (1994)). 
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of Education.52  PCSP funds state grant programs for charter 
schools.53  PCSP has provided millions of dollars over the years to new 
and existing charter schools.54 
Today the movement has grown tremendously with approximately 
forty-one states having charter school legislation.55  In the 2004–2005 
school year alone, approximately 400 new charter schools opened.56  
Indeed, “[f]ew reforms in the history of schooling have spread so 
quickly.”57  Yet as popular as charter schools are, few outside of the 
education system understand exactly what they are and how they op-
erate. 
Charter schools are “publicly funded, independently operated 
schools that are allowed to operate with more autonomy than tradi-
tional public schools in exchange for increased accountability.”58  Put 
simply, charter schools are public schools that have the freedom to 
produce results in the manner they think best.  That is, charters have 
“wide-ranging control over their own curriculum, instruction, staff-
ing, budget, internal organization, calendar, schedule, and much 
more.”59  However, if a charter school fails to produce the satisfactory 
results promised in their performance agreement with the state, 
funding is denied and the school is forced to shut down.60  So long as 
charters keep their side of the agreement, they remain exempt from 
the state and local regulations that apply to traditional public 
schools.61  Despite the differences between charters and traditional 
public schools, charter schools are still funded by tax dollars.62  Like 
 
 52 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM: FINAL 
REPORT, at ix (2004), available at http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/choice/pcsp-
final/finalreport.pdf. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Suhrid S. Gajendragadkar, The Constitutionality of Racial Balancing in Charter Schools, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 144, 149 (2006) (“[PCSP] initially allocated $6 million in start-up capital 
to charter schools.  By 2001, PCSP distributions . . . had grown to  $190 million.”). 
 55 Understanding Charter Schools, NAT’L CHARTER SCH. RES. CTR., http://
www.charterschoolcenter.org/priority-area/understanding-charter-schools (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2013). 
 56 Gajendragadkar, supra note 54, at 150.  However, it is difficult to estimate the number of 
charter schools with any precision because enrollment figures fluctuate whenever a new 
school or grade level opens.  Kane & Lauricella, supra note 48, at 207. 
 57 Kane & Lauricella, supra note 48, at 203. 
 58 Understanding Charter Schools, supra note 55. 
 59 FINN, ET AL., supra note 46, at 15. 
 60 PAUL T. HILL & ROBIN J. LAKE, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC 
EDUCATION 4 (2002). 
 61 Id. at 4–5. 
 62 FINN, ET AL., supra note 46, at 15.  Public funds are provided in a set amount for every 
child the charter school enrolls.  HILL & LAKE, supra note 60, at 4. 
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conventional public schools, charters are open to all students in a 
given school district who wish to enroll.63 
B.  The Origins of Race-Conscious Charter Schools 
The principles behind the school choice movement which led to 
the creation of charter schools can be traced to the Court’s 1925 de-
cision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.64  In Pierce, the Supreme Court held 
that parents have a fundamental right to raise and educate their chil-
dren as they choose.65  Historically, when the exercise of this right has 
served racial ends, it has been easy to evade integration.66  The same 
is true today in the era of resegregation.  Here, racial integration 
“grows more elusive as school choice enables new forms of student 
separation based on identities and aspirations.”67 
With the expansion of the charter school movement came a grass-
roots desire to create schools based on racial identity.68  Parents and 
local school districts pushed for the incorporation of Afrocentric cur-
 
 63 FINN, ET AL., supra note 46, at 15. 
 64 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 65 Id. at 535. 
 66 See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice:  Law, Education, and American Plural-
ism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 821 (2011) (suggesting that school choice was used as a tool of re-
sistance against desegregation after the Brown I decision, as white parents sent their chil-
dren to all-white private schools to avoid integration); See also Wendy Parker, The Color of 
Choice:  Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563, 600 (2001) (“[P]arental choice has 
been known to foster segregation.”).  A more specific example is the “freedom of choice” 
plans referenced earlier, which were used by white school districts to avoid the desegrega-
tion decrees of Brown II. 
 67 Minow, supra note 66, at 834. 
 68 It is important to note that this country has seen an explosion of identity charter schools 
other than Afrocentric schools.  For example, there is the Harvey Milk High School de-
signed for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender students, Hispanic cultural charters, 
Hebrew language charters, Muslim cultural charters, Armenian charters, and Christian 
conservative charters for home-schooled children.  See Benjamin Siracusa Hillman, Note, 
Is There a Place for Religious Charter Schools?, 118 YALE L.J. 554 (2008) (arguing in favor of 
religious charter schools); Note, Church, Choice, and Charters:  A New Wrinkle For Public Edu-
cation?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1750 (2009) (assessing the constitutionality of religious charter 
schools).  While the charters listed above are constitutionally problematic, they are not 
subject to the same level of heightened constitutional scrutiny as race.  While both race 
and religion are subject to the same test of strict scrutiny, the Court is far more likely to 
defer in cases of religion than in cases of race.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict 
in Fact:  An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793,  
857-62 (2006).  A question arises regarding the Hispanic charters because it is unclear if 
they are about race, culture, or language.  Additionally, the Harvey Milk school for LGBT 
students would likely receive rational basis review if challenged.  Therefore, while legal 
challenges may be posed against these alternative public schools in the future, there is a 
better chance that those schools would survive the Court’s scrutiny even if racial identity 
schools would not. 
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riculum.  They believed that reviving racial pride would lead to aca-
demic success.69  Specifically, it was thought to empower black stu-
dents by “improving their self-confidence, their self-esteem, and con-
sequently, their educational achievement,” all of which are 
considered absent in traditional public schools.70  This goal is accom-
plished by “teach[ing] basic courses by using Africa and the sociohis-
torical experience of Africans and African-Americans as its reference 
points.”71  Black students are encouraged to study school subjects and 
the world from a viewpoint “that places their cultural group at the 
center of the discussion,” something that is hardly ever done in pub-
lic schools—or private schools for that matter—in this country.72  
Simply put, this alternative schooling melds pride in black history and 
one’s self with traditional education.73 
However, as laudable as this community initiative is, race-
conscious charter schools remain constitutionally problematic be-
cause they erode social cohesion in the worst way possible—these 
schools can lead to racial segregation. 
III. A CLOSER LOOK:  THE MARCUS GARVEY AFRICAN CENTERED 
ACADEMY 
“I will have faith in myself . . . . I can learn!  I must learn!”74  That 
is the Marcus Garvey Academy’s school creed.  At assembly, students 
sing the black national anthem, the school creed, and recite black 
history facts.75  Students are required to participate in these activities 
before they commence any academic exercises.76  A “green line to 
success” is painted throughout the hallways that students must walk 
on the way to their classrooms.77  In class, students are required to 
acknowledge and greet adults in kiswahili.78  Inside the classroom and 
 
 69 See Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation:  The Jurisprudence of Choice and Diversity in Race and 
Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455, 504 (2005) (suggesting that Afrocentric 
curriculums can be considered “remedial segregation”). 
 70 Jarvis, supra note 34, at 1294. 
 71 Brown, Reexamanition, supra note 38, at 488. 
 72 Id. at 489. 
 73 Jarvis, supra note 34, at 1294. 
 74 Chastity Pratt Dawsey, How Marcus Garvey Academy Rises Above:  Family Oriented Atmosphere 
Contributes To Success, part 4, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.freep.com/
article/20100210/NEWS01/101230106/Part-4-5-How-Marcus-Garvey-Academy-rises-
above. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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throughout the school, “every subject and bulletin board includes 
mention of African or African-American history or culture.”79  Stu-
dents are also taught the Nguzo Saba, which includes the seven princi-
ples of Kwanzaa, the Egyptian values system, and African and African-
American history which are incorporated into their traditional public 
school education.80 
 The Garvey Academy is a kindergarten through eighth-grade 
charter school.  The school’s mission statement is “[t]o provide a 
high-performing learning environment emphasizing academic excel-
lence and community service with an African-centered curriculum.”81  
The school provides a wide array of traditional school programs 
combined with unique Afrocentric programs to effectuate its goal of 
academic, social, and community success.82 
Based on the 2011 enrollment demographic statistics, the Garvey 
Academy has enrolled 552 black students, one white student, one 
Asian student, and zero Hispanics.83  A study conducted in May 2011 
by Public School Review, an organization that provides free, detailed 
profiles of U.S. public schools and their surrounding communities, 
has estimated that the Garvey Academy student body is 97% black.84  
The Public School Review also compared this figure with the average 
percentages in Michigan public schools, where black students make 
up 23% and white students make up 68%.85  From these statistics, it is 
apparent that an Afrocentric curriculum is mainly attractive to Afri-
can Americans.86  However the Garvey Academy cannot and does not 
select their students on the basis of race.87  Therefore, there is no evi-
 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Garvey Academy, DETROIT PUB. SCH., http://detroitk12.org/schools/school/313 (last visit-
ed Mar. 15, 2013).  
 82 For example, in addition to honor roll clubs, advanced classes, science fairs, student 
council, and sports, the Garvey Academy also offers rites of passage trainings, manhood 
programs, and Kwanzaa feasts.  Marcus Garvey Academy, K12 ACADEMICS, http://
www.k12academics.com/national-directories/public-school/marcus-garvey-academy (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 83 See Garvey Academy—Current Enrollment Demographics as of 9/24/11, DETROIT PUB. SCH., 
http://detroitk12.org/schools/reports/profiles/313.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 84 Garvey Academy, PUB. SCH. REVIEW, http://www.publicschoolreview.com/school_ov/ 
school_id/40185 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Indeed, many charter schools are designed to attract a particular racial group.  Parker, 
supra note 66, at 601–02. 
 87 See HILL & LAKE, supra note 60, at 4 (noting that “charter schools may not handpick their 
students” and that if too many applicants apply, then charters must conduct an admis-
sions lottery). 
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dence of intentional racial discrimination.  But, that does not change 
the fact that the school is in effect composed of only one race. 
In 2008, the Garvey Academy outperformed the state average in 
most categories on the state-wide exams.88  Seeing as at the time this 
Comment is written the Garvey Academy still receives funding and is 
in operation, it is safe to say that it is holding up its end of the per-
formance agreement to both the state of Michigan and the parents of 
the Garvey students.  The academic and social success that the Garvey 
Academy and charter schools like it are attempting to achieve is truly 
admirable.  However, that does not make it constitutional.  Unfortu-
nately, what the community wants and what the Constitution de-
mands may be very different things.89  When such conflict occurs, 
what the Constitution mandates must be placed above all else. 
IV. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACE-CONSCIOUS 
CHARTER SCHOOLS UNDER THE ANTIBALKINIZATION PERSPECTIVE 
As previously mentioned, the antibalkinization perspective of the 
median voters on the Supreme Court is concerned with social cohe-
sion.90  It is this concern that drives the median voters to both uphold 
racial equality laws and strike them down.91  The origins of this inde-
pendent lens used to view Equal Protection Clause cases can be 
traced to Justice Powell and to Justice O’Connor. 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Powell’s “di-
versity” rationale for allowing affirmative action programs in higher 
education was clearly the result of his concern for social cohesion.92  
In Bakke, Justice Powell held that if a school could show that it need-
ed an affirmative action program in order to further the diversity of 
viewpoints—meaning admitting students of different backgrounds to 
further the educational experience of all in the classroom—then the 
policy should be upheld.93  In Justice Powell’s line of reasoning, view-
point diversity fosters social cohesion because it brings different 
 
 88 Dawsey, supra note 74. 
 89 Even policies that seek to benefit racial minorities are not always seen as beneficial under 
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk:  Anti-
subordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1470 (2004) (noting that the Court has struck down numerous affirmative action 
laws which are laws benefitting racial minorities in schooling and employment, under 
strict scrutiny review, predominately by those on the court who espouse the anti-
classification perspective). 
 90 Siegel, supra note 3, at 1299. 
 91 Id. 
 92 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 93 Id. at 312–16. 
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members of our society together.  It does not create resentment or 
divisiveness as would be the case if the admissions criteria were based 
on something like a racial quota. 
Justice O’Connor embraced Justice Powell’s diversity rationale, 
and with it, his concern for social cohesion, in Grutter v. Bollinger.94  In 
Grutter, Justice O’Connor held that the University of Michigan Law 
School’s race-conscious admissions program should be upheld be-
cause the state had a compelling interest in attaining a diverse stu-
dent body.95  She said that in order to create legitimate leaders in our 
society, “it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to 
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.”96  Her 
concern for preserving social cohesion is evident from her own 
words. 
Justice Kennedy expanded upon the views of his predecessors on 
the Court by espousing what became known as the antibalkinzation 
perspective in his concurrence in Parents Involved.97  In striking down 
the use of racial balancing in school admissions to diversify local pub-
lic schools, he expressed his disdain for policies that have the effect 
of “exacerbat[ing] group division.”98  For Justice Kennedy, increasing 
the salience of race as a factor is what compromises social cohesion.  
That is because increasing the salience of race highlights one’s dif-
ferences instead of one’s commonalities to others in society.  In order 
to live in a society where race no longer matters, highlighting differ-
ences only thwarts this goal.  Justice Kennedy’s concern is clear given 
his fear of the government classifying an individual’s racial identity.  
In Parents Involved, he said that “to be forced to live under a state-
mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in 
our society.”99  For Justice Kennedy, “both racial stratification and its 
 
 94 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003). 
 95 Id. at 343.  The race-conscious admissions program was also narrowly tailored because 
admissions decisions were not based on racial quotas but rather on a flexible and holistic 
analysis like that of the Harvard Plan.  Id. at 334–35. 
 96 Id. at 332 (emphasis added). 
 97 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782–98 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence is viewed as the controlling opinion. 
 98 Siegel, supra note 3, at 1308.  Justice Kennedy is not opposed to racial policies that en-
hance social cohesion.  Rather, he only finds those laws that increase the salience of race 
which—in his view and in the views of the former median justices—create social divisive-
ness to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  See Parents Involved, 127 U.S. at 788–
89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[School districts] 
are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and 
without treating each student in different fasion solely on the basis of a systematic, indi-
vidual typing by race.”). 
 99 Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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repair each have the potential to balkanize.”  Therefore, such policies 
are inconsistent with the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution.100 
In applying this developing perspective of the Supreme Court’s 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence to race-conscious charter 
schools, it is clear that they are unconstitutional because they break 
down social cohesion leading to the racial segregation of school chil-
dren.  In other words, race-conscious charter schools are the epitome 
of increasing the salience of race—the very thing that Justice Kenne-
dy feared most.  As mentioned previously, the Court struck down a 
school district’s attempt at racial balancing in order to diversify the 
local public schools in Parents Involved.  This was an integrationist ef-
fort.  In comparison, race-conscious charter schools may in fact be 
considered worse under this constitutional interpretation because 
race-consciousness can be expected to lead to segregation.101  That is 
because segregation can be considered the most severe result of 
breaking down social cohesion. 
An example of the erosion of social cohesion by the Garvey Acad-
emy can be found by looking no further than to the school’s enroll-
ment patterns.  As previously mentioned, approximately 97% of the 
student body is African-American.102  The demographics of the Garvey 
Academy demonstrate that an Afrocentric curriculum would presum-
ably be more appealing to African Americans.103  This finding is cor-
 
100 Siegel, supra note 3, at 1308.  To Justice Kennedy and the former median voters, both 
intentional discrimination and measures meant to remedy discrimination are unconstitu-
tional if they threaten social cohesion. 
101 See Jarvis, supra note 34, at 1299 (“Implicit in Afrocentric curricula is a rejection of the 
integrationist approach . . . .”). 
102 Garvey Academy, PUB. SCH. REVIEW, http://www.publicschoolreview.com/school_ov/
school_id/40185 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013). 
103 It may be the case that attraction to these charter schools is in part due to the pre-existing 
racialized residential patterns.  It could be the case that the school district that created 
the charter school is predominately African-American to begin with so those students 
from that pool of the population opt into the charter school.  That would mean that 
there is no new segregation being created.  The problem, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion, can be viewed as systemic.  Moreover, the Civil Rights Project at UCLA conducted a 
2010 study finding that “charter schools are more racially isolated than traditional public 
schools in virtually every state and large metropolitan area in the nation.”  See ERICA 
FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY:  CHARTER 
SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 4 (Jan. 2010), available 
at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/
choice-without-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf.  The 
study attributed the fact that “[c]harter schools attract a higher percentage of black stu-
dents than traditional public schools, in part because they tend to be located in urban ar-
eas.”  Id.  However, this study did not address the phenomenon of race-conscious or other 
identity charter schools.  Therefore, putting a racial label on a charter school still has an 
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roborated by the Garvey Academy’s operation.  The name of the 
school, “The Marcus Garvey African Centered Academy,” alone is 
enough to signify to the world that this school is meant to serve Afri-
can Americans and African Americans only.104  Looking to the inter-
nal operations of the school, from morning assembly to the hallway 
bulletin boards to the daily lesson plans, these students are reminded 
of the color of their skin.  It therefore makes sense that African 
Americans alone would choose this alternative as a tool of academic 
and social success.  However, what this seemingly benign attraction to 
schools like the Garvey Academy does in practice is threaten cohesion 
in our society by opening the door to the segregation of black stu-
dents. 
Further evidence of race-conscious charter schools’ ability to 
break down social cohesion comes from the reaction of scholars like 
Dr. Kenneth B. Clark.  Dr. Clark, whose psychological research 
helped steer the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, now finds him-
self back in a world that he and so many other civil rights leaders ded-
icated their lives to changing.105  In the wake of the Garrett decision, 
discussed below, Dr. Clark expressed his disdain for race-conscious 
charter schools.  He said, “It’s outrageous.  It’s absurd.  It’s a contin-
uation of the whole segregation nonsense.”106  He also noted that the-
se schools did not make any sense “unless this society wants to re-
gress.”107  Dr. Clark’s outrage makes it clear that schools with an 
Afrocentric curriculum are sending a message.  Although they are 
not intentionally discriminating against other racial or ethnic groups 
in their admissions process, the undeniable effect of the existence of 
such schools is segregation.  Under the antibalkinization perspective, 
this is antithetical to social cohesion.  Therefore, these schools must 
be deemed unconstitutional. 
 
independent effect of not only attracting African Americans, but also dismissing members 
of other racial groups. 
104 The school was named after the famous black scholar and orator, Marcus Garvey, who was 
a strong proponent of the Black Nationalism and Pan-Africanism movements in the early 
twentieth century. People & Events:  Marcus Garvey, 1887–1940, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/amex/garvey/peopleevents/p_garvey.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013). 
105 Sam Roberts, Separate Schools For Male Blacks Igniting Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1990, at 
B1.  The research referred to is Dr. Clark’s famous “doll studies” in Brown I, in which he 
used dolls to study children’s attitudes about race to prove that segregation bred a sense 
of inferiority in black children.  Brown v. Board at Fifty:  “With an Even Hand,” LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2013). 
106 Roberts, supra note 105, at 1. 
107 Id. 
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To state what may be obvious, if the Garvey Academy were a pri-
vate school, there would not be a constitutional issue.  Rather, Garvey 
and charters like it are public schools.  Even though these schools may 
resemble private schools, they still bear the imprimatur of the state in 
the racial representations they make.  However, there is another 
problem.  The reality is that many of the families who send their chil-
dren to these charter schools cannot afford to send their children to 
the private schools of their choice due to obscenely high tuition fees 
and/or the inability to obtain or pay for transportation.  Therefore, 
charter schools allow low-income families to act as a powerful con-
sumer in an educational marketplace that has traditionally been be-
yond their reach.108  However, these charter schools are funded by tax 
dollars.  They are funded not just by the tax dollars of the parents 
who send their children to these schools, but also by parents who do 
not.  Therefore, despite the control over education that the charter 
school gives certain taxpayers, the public and the state still fund this 
racialized curriculum.  To say that a charter school embraces race-
consciousness is no different than saying that the state of Michigan 
does.  That is the source of the problem. 
A. Garrett as an Indicator of Future Litigation 
 While race-conscious charter schools are unconstitutional under 
the antibalkinization perspective, the issue has yet to be litigated at 
any level of our court system.  However, there is one case that 
reached the federal district court in the Eastern District of Michigan 
that skimmed the top of the issue of race-conscious public school-
ing.109  This Comment maintains that Garrett v. Board Of Education has 
left open the possibility for future litigation over race-conscious char-
 
108 The author does not discuss school voucher programs because that presupposes a discus-
sion of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment that is beyond the scope of this 
Comment.  However, it is important to keep in mind that voucher programs in the past 
have enabled some low income families to send their children to private schools although 
they have predominately been parochial schools.  See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 
536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
109 In addition to Garrett, there were two other attempts at creating an all-male, all-African-
American academy that were also found unconstitutional.  In Florida’s Dade County 
school system, there was a proposal to “limit one kindergarten and one first grade class to 
black male students taught by a male teacher.”  Roberts, supra note 105, at 1.  The De-
partment of Education found that the proposal violated three federal civil rights protec-
tions.  Id.  This was found “regardless of the fact that 98 percent of the school’s students 
were black.”  Id.  A similar proposal was rejected in the Milwaukee public school system.  
See Michael John Weber, Immersed in an Educational Crisis:  Alternative Programs for African-
American Males, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1993).  However, the most notable is the 
Garrett decision which, as a result, will be the focus of this Part’s analysis. 
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ter schools.110  It predicts that the results of future litigation will be 
unfavorable to the school district as it would have been in Garrett if 
the racial issue was ever fully addressed. 
In the events leading up to the Garrett decision, Detroit sought to 
create three male academies.111  The all-male academies were to have 
an Afrocentric curriculum.112  The school board justified the creation 
of these academies as a way of saving at-risk black male youth.113  It 
was a response to the crisis of “high homicide, unemployment, and 
drop-out rates” that African American males faced, especially in cities 
like Detroit.114  “The primary rationale for the [a]cademies [was] 
simply that co-educational programs aimed at improving male per-
formance have failed.”115 
A few weeks before the all-male academies were scheduled to 
open, the parents of African-American female students from Detroit 
sued the school board for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment among other statutes.116  Specifically, 
they claimed that the creation of the all-male academies and the ex-
clusion of female students constituted sex-based discrimination.117  
Plaintiffs argued that the school board “inappropriately relie[d] on 
gender as a proxy for ‘at risk’ students.”118  The district court in find-
ing for the plaintiffs, held that the school board failed to show how 
the exclusion of female students from the academies would be neces-
sary to their stated goal of “combat[ing] unemployment, dropout and 
homicide rates among urban males.”119  The court also found that 
female students were similarly at risk.120  The court then granted a 
preliminary injunction on the opening of the academies, finding that 
allowing these schools to open would be a violation of equal protec-
tion as it was based on impermissible gender classifications.121 
What is fascinating about the Garrett decision is that in the entirety 
of the analysis, it in no way mentions the all-African-American feature 
 
110 Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
111 Id. at 1006. 
112 Id.  Examples of other programs included a “Rites of Passage” program, career prepara-
tion, an emphasis on male responsibility, mentoring, extended weekday classes, Saturday 
classes, and counseling.  Id. 
113 Id. at 1007. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1005. 
117 Id. at 1007. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1008. 
120  Id. 
121 Id. at 1007. 
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of the academies.  It “ignore[s] the significance of race.”122  However, 
the district court was not mistaken in doing so, because “the plaintiffs 
did not challenge the de facto racial segregation of the [academies],” 
rather they only challenged the gender-based exclusion.123  The court 
was able to avoid opening a Pandora’s box of racial issues.  But how 
long would this last? 
In the wake of Garrett, a number of constitutional law scholars be-
gan to consider what the district court did not:  the constitutionality 
of the all-black academies.124  More specifically, many pondered what 
the plaintiffs would look like if there were litigation in the future.  
Many scholars believe that since the push for a racialized curriculum 
comes from within African-American communities, it is likely that a 
constitutional challenge will come from the members of those same 
communities.125  This conclusion is plausible since it was the parents 
of black female students who brought suit in Garrett. 
This Comment agrees with the predictions that existing scholar-
ship has made.  However, where this perspective differs is the way in 
which the Supreme Court will come to the conclusion that race-
conscious charter schools are unconstitutional.  The majority of the 
legal scholarship on Garrett tends to focus on a violation of equal pro-
tection under the anti-segregationist view of Brown.  Several scholars 
have suggested that race-conscious charter schools are unconstitu-
tional because they create the very stigmatic harm that Brown v. Board 
of Education stood to eradicate.126  However, since this early 1990s 
scholarship, Parents Involved has been decided.127 Along with it, a 
third, independent theme has emerged out of the Court’s analytical 
 
122 See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consiousness:  The Case 
of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753, 827 (2000). 
123 Id. 
124 See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?:  The Paradoxes Created by 
Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV. 813 (1993); Brown-
Nagin, supra note 123; Richard Cummings, All-Male Black Schools:  Equal Protection, the New 
Separatism and Brown v. Board of Education, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725 (1993); Jarvis, 
supra note 34; Levit, supra note 69; Weber, supra note 110. 
125 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 125, at 857; Jarvis, supra note 34, at 1300 (predicting that 
“[c]hallenges to Afrocentric curricula are more likely to come from Black parents” due to 
the concern that because their children are not getting as good of an education as white 
children, they are not given an equal chance to succeed in society).  Their main concern 
will be the resurfacing of stigmatic harm that derives from segregation.  Another reason 
might be that the issue of race-conscious charter schools is so controversial that few out-
side the African-American community would be willing to challenge them.  From this 
perspective it makes sense that the challenge would have to come from those who are 
most affected by the creation and existence of these alternative public schools. 
126 Jarvis, supra note 34, at 1299. 
127 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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tool box.  As a result, this Comment proposes that if the Supreme 
Court ever grants a writ of certiorari to a challenge against race-
conscious charter schools, it will be analyzed under Justice Kennedy’s 
antibalkinization perspective.  One reason is that Justice Kennedy is 
the median voter.  As such, he has the ability to shape the way in 
which the majority creates the opinion.  In addition, Justice Kennedy 
had the last word in his concurrence in Parents Involved—now consid-
ered the controlling opinion—in an area of the law that constantly 
evolves.  Therefore, it is likely that the majority of the Court will fol-
low his lead.  Another reason is that the antibalkinization perspective 
has elements that appeal to both the majority members and minority 
members of the Court.  For example, preventing racial classifications 
even though it may not amount to intentional discrimination by the 
state is something that anti-classificationists would likely agree with.  
Likewise, anti-subordinationists can agree with the idea of bringing 
society together as a way to eliminate racial stratification.  For those 
reasons, the antibalkinization perspective may even emerge as a dom-
inant form of analysis in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
“Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to 
the sunlit path of racial justice . . . . Now is the time to make justice a 
reality . . . .”128 
It has been fifty years since Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his “I 
Have a Dream” speech, but his words are needed today just as much 
as they were needed in 1963.  While America has made many strides 
away from its tumultuous racial past, it is far from achieving the kind 
of racial equality that Justice Kennedy spoke of in Parents Involved:  
the kind of equality where race no longer matters.129  Unfortunately, 
we live in an era of resegregation, although the terms are quite dif-
ferent from historical segregation.  However, as a matter of constitu-
tional law and as a matter of policy that does not make it right. 
This Comment has analyzed the school choice movement and the 
emergence of race-conscious charter schools under a new theme of 
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence:  antibalkinization.  The 
time will come when school districts will be confronted with an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge.  When they are, the Court will not rule 
 
128 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at the March on Washington (Aug. 28, 1963), availa-
ble at http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf. 
129 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782. 
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in their favor, because a threat to social cohesion is a threat to human 
dignity and an affront on the Constitution.  School districts must, 
then, surrender to the interpretation of the Constitution and forfeit 
their efforts at racially-based alternative schooling.  However, that 
does not mean the fight for equality in education must end.  
 It is the everlasting hope of this author that school districts heed 
this Comment as a warning but also that they accept it as an encour-
aging message that there is a practical answer to the questions that 
plagued the Supreme Court back in 1955.  The only way to create 
equality in education is to meaningfully improve traditional public 
schools.  The power is clearly within the community to do so, for if 
not, the charter school movement would never have gotten this far.  
It is up to the members of the community to shift their focus to 
providing quality education that is fair, equal, and available to all re-
gardless of race or class.  If they do, the results will be constitutional 
and the benefits to the children of this country will be incalculable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
